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Abstract
Pension reform: Disentangling retirement and savings responses*
In January 2006, the Dutch government implemented a pension reform that substantially 
reduced the public pension wealth of workers born in 1950 or later. At the same time, a 
tax-facilitated savings plan was introduced that substantially reduced the saving costs 
of all workers, irrespective of birth year. This paper uses linked administrative and survey 
data to assess the effect of the reform on the savings and retirement expectations and 
realizations of two virtually identical male cohorts that differ only in treatment status, 
the treated having been born in 1950 and the controls having been born in 1949. We 
show that retirement expectations are in line with realizations and that the reform had 
the intended effect on the labor supply for the larger part of the workers, namely, those 
without sufficient means to substantially increase private savings to counter the effect 
of the reform. These workers, who are generally in worse health, have zero substitution 
rates between private and public wealth. On the other hand, there is a group of mostly 
high-wage workers who participate in the tax-facilitated Life Course Savings Scheme and 
who increase private savings to fully counter the impact of the drop in public wealth. A 
further, unintended side effect of the introduction of the tax-facilitated savings plan is 
that high wage earners who are not affected by the drop in pension wealth retire even 
sooner than initially planned.
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1. Introduction 
Most industrialized countries have sophisticated pension systems that provide substantial pension 
benefits after retirement. These benefits have important effects on employees’ intertemporal 
work and savings choices. However, due to population aging and declining fertility rates, many 
of these countries have started to implement major pension reforms aimed at increasing the labor 
supply of older workers. Of importance is whether and to what extent individuals adjust their 
retirement and savings plans in response to changes in public pension wealth. Is private wealth a 
good substitute for the mandatory buildup of public pensions and how does this interact with 
labor supply choices? 
 This paper looks at the effect of a large permanent and unanticipated change in pension 
wealth on the private savings decisions and retirement expectations and realizations of Dutch 
public sector workers born in 1949 and 1950. As of January 2006, the pension rights of those 
born in 1950 (or later) were substantially reduced, while the pension rights of those born in 1949 
(or earlier) were unaffected. The 1949 cohort could retire at age 62 years and three months at 
70% of their gross wages. For the 1950 cohort, the gross replacement rate dropped to 64% if they 
wanted to retire at age 62 years and three months or they had to work an additional 13 months to 
obtain the 70% rate of their slightly older counterparts. At the same time as the pension reform in 
2006, the Dutch government introduced the so-called Life Course Savings Scheme 
(Levensloopregeling), a tax-facilitated savings program that permits tax-free savings of up to 
12% of annual earnings in a fund that could be used to finance periods of non-employment, such 
as a sabbatical or early retirement. The introduction of the Life Course Savings Scheme thus 
enables all workers—those treated by the pension reform as well as those who are unaffected by 
it—to privately save at lower costs. 
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 We use linked administrative and survey data over the period 2007–2014 in which we 
observe the pension rights, individual retirement expectations, decisions to participate in savings 
programs, and actual retirement choices of public sector workers born in 1949 and 1950. This 
setup enables us to apply a sharp regression discontinuity design to measure the short-run 
response (one year after the implementation of the reform) and the longer-run response (up to 
eight years after the reform). 
 Our paper is directly relevant to the retirement literature as well as the literature on the 
substitution between public pension wealth and private savings. Reasoning along the lines of the 
standard life cycle model, public pension wealth will affect the accumulation of other forms of 
private savings. In a more general life cycle model with endogenous retirement, the effect of 
public pension wealth is ambiguous (Feldstein, 1974). Moreover, the rate of substitution between 
private and public pension wealth depends on a range of factors, such as tax incentives, the 
relative rate of return to private assets, financial literacy, liquidity constraints, and the myopia of 
individuals (Alessie et al., 2013). Therefore, the degree of substitution between private and 
public savings in practice has been the subject of many empirically oriented papers. It is found 
that private wealth and public pension wealth are not perfect substitutes and that the degree of 
substitution varies across different studies, between around 20–67% (e.g., Feldstein, 1974; 
Feldstein and Pellechio, 1979; Gale, 1998; Bernheim, 2002; Engelhardt & Kumar. 2011; 
literature reviewed by Alessie et al., 2013). Attanasio and Bruggiavini (2003) and Attanasio and 
Rohwedder (2003) further find that the degree of substitution between private and public pension 
wealth could also depend on the stage of individuals’ life cycles. Both studies find that the 
degree of substitution between private and public wealth increases with age. However, this is 
likely to differ across older workers too, since the extent to which people can increase private 
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savings also depends on whether older people are financially constrained. For these financially 
constrained workers, adjustments in the labor supply are the only way to counter the drop in 
public pension wealth. 
 Labor supply is an important choice variable for older workers confronted with 
unexpected losses in pension wealth. Workers can theoretically postpone retirement to fully 
compensate for the loss in pension wealth. This would imply that, in the absence of additional 
savings, the stabilization of post-retirement income is the main motive and that this is derived at 
no loss in consumption. This scenario would be consistent with low substitution rates between 
private and public wealth for older workers. Low substitution rates between private and public 
pension wealth could also arise when workers choose to not increase savings, stick to the earlier 
planned retirement age, and thus accept lower post-retirement income. Our study adds to the 
literature by focusing on a cohort of workers nearing retirement, a group of workers for whom 
changes in pension wealth require a timely response and reforms can have potentially dramatic 
effects. As Attanasio and Bruggiavini (2003) and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003), we expect 
strong behavioral responses from older workers. However, one can also expect great 
heterogeneity in the behavioral responses with respect to income and other financial resources. 
The financially constrained can only adjust the labor supply to compensate for the drop in public 
pension wealth, whereas those with more financial resources can use these resources to cushion 
the impact of the drop in public pension wealth. 
 Our paper is closest to those of Botazzi et al. (2006) and McFall (2011). Botazzi et al. 
(2006) exploit a series of pension reforms that took place in Italy between 1992 and 1997 to 
estimate the effects of these reforms on households’ retirement expectations and private wealth 
accumulation. In their analyses, the authors effectively compare the pre-reform behavior of 
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cohorts of private sector workers, public sector workers, and self-employed with post-reform 
behavior. Their findings indicate that workers revised their expectations in accordance with the 
incentives of the reforms and that there is a substantial offset between private and perceived 
public pension wealth. McFall (2011) exploits the 2008 stock market crash to test whether 
retirement plans in the US in 2009 react to a wealth shock in a way that is consistent with a life 
cycle model with retirement choice. The author finds that, among the 306 workers in the sample 
who hold private pension wealth, the average wealth loss between July 2008 and June 2009 is 
associated with an increase in expected retirement of about 2.5 months. 
 Our study differs from these previous studies in several ways. First, we isolate a single 
and clear reform that led to a sharp discontinuity design; that is, the assignment rule is simple 
and clear and implies a strong differential treatment of workers born around January 1, 1950. 
The cohorts are nearing retirement ages and (as we will show) are well informed about the 
consequences of the reform. This reduces the noise in observed retirement expectations and 
savings choices. Second, the drop in pension wealth applied to all workers. McFall (2011) 
confines the effect of the stock market crash to a specific group of workers, namely, those 
holding sufficient private assets to influence retirement behavior.
2
 Third, our estimations focus 
exclusively on workers born in 1949 and 1950, two cohorts that are homogenous with respect to 
observed characteristics and only differ in their treatment status and that are not subject to other 
differential policy treatments that can bias our results. The treatment period of Botazzi et al. 
(2006) is long (1992–2000) and it is therefore not possible to isolate the different impacts of 
several pension reforms that occurred during this period. Moreover, the authors’ sample includes 
                                                          
2 In this paper, wealth is defined as wealth in checking, savings, money market accounts, bonds, mutual funds, 
stocks, and real estate (excluding primary homes).  
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a wide age range and they are unable to fully exclude differential treatment in other domains of 
the social security system, especially for younger workers (those entering the labor market after 
1995). Fourth, our paper includes detailed heterogeneity analyses that provide information on the 
extent to which the substitution rates between private and public wealth and labor supply differ 
with important worker characteristics. Finally, our results partly confirm the earlier results of 
Botazzi et al. (2006). Workers revise their expectations in accordance with the incentives 
provided by the pension reform. However, while these authors find a substantial offset between 
private and perceived public pension wealth, we show that substitution rates between private and 
public wealth are generally low but vary greatly with income, education, and health.  
Our analyses show that the treatment group immediately adjusts their retirement 
expectations with about 10.5 months. The drop in pension wealth is equivalent to 13 months of 
earlier retirement. The difference in expectations between the treated and untreated cohorts 
remains relatively stable in later years. Our results thus imply that the average treated worker 
compensates for the drop in pension rights mainly at the expense of leisure in retirement. 
However, the savings rate (as measured by participation in the tax-facilitated Life Course 
Savings Scheme) is more than twice the savings rate of the controls. The group that participates 
in the savings program (16% of the treated and 7% of the controls) states that they expect to 
finance about nine months and 13 months of earlier retirement, for the control and treated 
cohorts, respectively. For these savings program participants, the difference of four months 
between the treated and control groups can be interpreted as a pure crowding-out effect induced 
by the drop in pension wealth, while the nine months of saved earlier retirement of the control 
group can be interpreted as the impact of the reduction in savings costs (the tax exemption that 
applies to the Life Course Savings Scheme). Actual retirement, observed eight years after the 
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reform in 2014, was in strong accordance with previously expressed retirement expectations. Our 
findings thus show that individuals are forward looking and that the reform had the intended 
effect on the labor supply for the larger part of workers, namely, those without sufficient means 
to substantially increase private savings to counter the effect of the reform. These workers, who 
generally have lower wages and education levels and are in worse health, thus have low 
substitution rates between private and public wealth. On the other hand, there is a group of 
mostly high-wage workers who are less affected by the reform. They participate in the tax-
facilitated Life Course Savings Scheme and are therefore able to cushion the impact of the 
reform by private wealth. There is therefore indeed considerable heterogeneity in the substitution 
rates between public and private wealth. A further unintended side effect of the introduction of 
the tax-facilitated savings plan is the decision of high wage earners not affected by the drop in 
pension wealth to retire sooner than initially planned. 
 This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch pension system and the 
2006 reform of the public sector’s pension system. Section 3 describes the data and variables 
used in the analyses. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical analyses. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes and discusses the implications of our findings. 
 
2. The Dutch pension system and the 2006 reform 
2.1 The Dutch pension system 
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first pillar is the National Old Age 
Pension (AOW), which is the basic public old age pension provided by the government to all 
residents of the Netherlands when they reach the statutory retirement age (65 in 2006). The 
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AOW is a pay-as-you-go system in which current payments are financed by income taxes and 
provides a flat-rate pension benefit related to the net minimum wage. 
The second pillar consists of earning-related sector pensions. These pension schemes are 
predominantly of the defined benefit type and fully funded. Sector pensions are negotiated 
between unions and employer organizations at the sector or firm level and are usually set forth in 
collective agreements. Participation is mandatory for individual workers, ensuring that each 
worker is covered by the sector pension. The Pensions and Savings Act (Pensioen en 
Spaarfondsenwet) until 2007 and the Pensions Act from 2007 onward (Pensioenwet) dictate that 
the administration of the sector pension schemes in the second pillar is delegated to pension 
funds to which both employers and employees must contribute. The sector pension schemes 
allow workers to retire before the statutory retirement age of the public pension. Until 2006, 
contributions to sectoral early retirement schemes were tax deductible, which substantially 
increased their financial attractiveness. This tax advantage amounted to about 25% of the net 
early retirement allowance, partly because of the progressive tax system (Euwals et al., 2006). 
Typically, contributions to the sector pension schemes were such that, in 2006, a public sector 
employee who had served 40 years in the public sector could retire at the age of 62 and three 
months at a gross replacement rate of 70% of average yearly earnings since 2004. Therefore, 
early retirement facilitated by the preferential tax treatment of sector pension schemes was the 
social norm in the Netherlands. Approximately 80% of all workers retired at the age of 62 or 
younger before 2006 and only 6% retired at the age of 65 (Statistics Netherlands, 2009). 
The third pillar finally consists of all voluntarily built-up savings supplementary to the 
public and sector pensions. These are offered by private insurance companies and typically yield 
annuity payments at retirement age. Due to the well-established public and sector pension 
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systems, the third pillar is less well developed in the Netherlands. It provides only 5% of the 
retirement income that is provided by the second pillar of the pension system (Bovenberg & 
Gradus, 2015). 
 
2.2 The 2006 reform of the pension system 
In 2006, the government abolished the favorable tax deductibility of contributions to early 
retirement schemes that are part of the second pillar of the Dutch pension system for all 
employees born in 1950 or later. In response to the abolishment of the favorable tax treatment, 
the government and unions in the public sector negotiated a new pension scheme in the summer 
of 2005 that became effective on January 1, 2006, for workers born in 1950 or later and for those 
born before 1950 who had not worked continuously in the public sector since April 1, 1997. This 
new scheme, called the ABP Flexible Pension Scheme, is administered by the public sector’s 
pension fund (Algemeen Burgelijk Pensioenfonds, or ABP). In the Netherlands, as in other 
countries, there has been an ongoing debate about the sustainability of the pension system and 
the need for reform. Therefore, the announcement of a reform was not entirely unexpected. What 
was unexpected, however, was the speed at which the reform was implemented, as well as the 
strong differential treatment of workers born around January 1, 1950, which came as a surprise 
when it was announced on July 5, 2005. 
 This new ABP Flexible Pension Scheme involves (i) a drop in pension benefits, (ii) a 
small increase in pension contribution payments to partly account for the drop in pension 
benefits resulting from (i), and (iii) stronger incentives to continue working, generated by 
penalties on pension income when retiring before the statutory pension age (AOW) and by 
supplements for later retirement. Furthermore, the eligibility age for early pension benefits has 
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been increased to 60 years and workers can now decide to continue working until their 70th 
birthday.
3
 
Workers born before 1950 remained entitled to the old, more generous early retirement 
scheme if they had worked continuously in the public sector since April 1, 1997. This means that 
such workers could still retire early, between ages 55 and 65. For those born before 1950, 
retirement at age 62 years and three months yields a pension benefit with a gross replacement 
rate of 70% of average yearly earnings since 2004 (equivalent to an annual benefit of €31,500 for 
the median worker in our sample). Due to the reform, a typical employee born in 1950 or later 
with 40 years of tenure would obtain a gross replacement rate of 64% when retiring at the age of 
62 years and three months (equivalent to an annual benefit of €28,500 for the median worker in 
our sample). To attain a replacement rate of 70%, these workers would have to postpone 
retirement by 13 months. 
 At the time of the pension reform in 2006, the Dutch government also introduced the Life 
Course Savings Scheme (Levensloopregeling), a tax-facilitated savings program. The program, 
open to all workers, irrespective of their year of birth, permits tax-free savings of up to 12% of 
annual earnings in a fund that can be used to finance periods of non-employment, such as a 
sabbatical or early retirement.
4
 The savings accounts are held at insurance companies, banks, or 
the subsidiary companies of pension funds. Various life course saving products are offered. Life 
Course Saving accounts can take the form of traditional savings, an investment account, or a mix 
of both products. All workers are allowed to save up to a maximum of 210% of their annual 
earnings in the fund. At a gross replacement rate of 70%, this would cover three years of early 
retirement. Those born in the years 1950 through 1954 and who therefore had less time to save 
                                                          
3
 It is not mandatory for employers to keep employees when they become eligible for the AOW. Employers are 
allowed to discharge such employees when they reach the age of eligibility.  
4
 Employers must allow their employees to take leave financed by the Life Course Savings program.  
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210% than older cohorts were allowed to save more than 12% of their annual earnings, as long as 
the cumulative maximum does not exceed 210% of annual earnings. It must be noted, however, 
that workers of the 1950 cohort must save approximately 16% of their annual earnings for six 
years to finance early retirement at age 62 (rather than retirement at age 63 and one month). It is 
likely that only a very small fraction of such workers is willing or capable of saving such a large 
share of their earnings each year before retirement. Nevertheless, we expect workers treated by 
the reform who do not wish to change their retirement plans but plan to repair part of their 
pension wealth to invest more in these savings, since, due to the tax exemption, it is the cheapest 
saving product in the Netherlands. 
Besides the introduction of the ABP Flexible Pension Scheme, no other institutional 
changes differentially affect the 1949 and 1950 cohorts in 2006. We can therefore apply a sharp 
regression discontinuity design. For the internal validity of our research design, it is crucial that 
workers born in 1950 are aware of the consequences of the new pension system for their 
individual situation. After the announcement of the reform in the summer of 2005, the pension 
fund ABP launched a massive campaign to inform its clients about the new pension and Life 
Course Savings Scheme and explain its financial implications. In a special newsletter, unions, 
employer organizations, and the ABP jointly explained the ABP Flexible Pension Scheme. 
Furthermore, all 1.2 million ABP members received a personalized letter about the core 
characteristics of the new scheme, along with a complete electronic service package for public 
service employers. Therefore, one can assume that, on January 1, 2006, most public sector 
employees born after 1949 and their employers were indeed made aware of the exogenous shock 
in their pension rights. Of course, this must be verified empirically, which we do when 
discussing the descriptive analyses in Section 3. 
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3. Data collection and descriptive analyses 
3.1 Data collection 
We use survey data that we match to administrative data for a panel of male full-time employees 
in the public sector who were born in 1949 or 1950.
5,6
 The administrative data are available from 
2006 until 2014 and contain detailed information on individuals’ accrued pension rights at the 
ABP, retirement status, pension benefits, annual wage, number of contractual working hours, 
tenure in the public sector, and employment subsector. 
 The panel survey data was started one year after the new pension system was established 
in 2007 and was repeated annually until 2012. The data in the first wave in 2007 were gathered 
in two stages. In the first stage, all 27,719 male public sector workers in the Netherlands who 
were born in 1949 or 1950 were invited in January 2007 to participate in our Internet survey by 
requesting their e-mail addresses. The invitation letter, sent by surface mail, included general 
information about the social usefulness of the survey but did not disclose information about the 
research question or the nature of our research strategy. We did not inform potential participants 
that the invitation letter was sent only to public sector employees born in 1949 and 1950. The 
letter also explicitly assured confidentiality. In the second stage, the 11,458 workers who sent 
their e-mail address received, in March 2007, an e-mail with a link to the survey. References to 
the nature of our research question and research strategy were also carefully avoided in the 
survey. 
 In total, 8,516 individuals completed the questionnaire in 2007. The response rates to the 
surveys for the two birth cohorts were virtually identical in 2007, 30.5% and 31.0% for the 
                                                          
5
 De Grip et al. (2012) and Montizaan et al. (2009, 2011, 2016) exploit the same data set to estimate the impact of 
retrenchment in pension rights on short-term workers’ health and well-being and human capital investments. 
6
 The survey and administrative data are available only for these two specific birth cohorts. We focus on male 
employees because, in the Netherlands, in this birth cohort, male workers are usually the main family wage earner 
and only a small, selective fraction of women in this cohort is are still working at the age of 57 or 58. 
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treated and controls, respectively (see also De Grip et al., 2012, who use the same data). Our 
analyses are restricted to full-time employees who worked continuously in the public sector since 
1997 until 2006 and did not work in strenuous jobs (e.g., firefighters, police officers).
7
 For these 
workers, the pension reform is clear and simple, since age is the only criterion that determines 
whether a worker is eligible for the restricted or the more generous retirement scheme, 
guaranteeing the internal validity of the regression discontinuity design. After these selections, 
the final estimation sample in 2007 consists of 6,702 men, 3,468 of whom were born in 1950 and 
3,234 in 1949. The survey was repeated in March of every year until 2012. The responses 
numbered 4,142 in 2008, 6,048 in 2009, 5,600 in 2010, and 4,020 in 2011. The increase in the 
number of responses in 2009 is due to a renewed invitation to participate in the Internet survey. 
This invitation was sent to counter panel attrition. In Tables B1–B4 in Appendix B, we examine 
whether sample attrition was selective with respect to the treatment. These tables show that the 
response rates do not differ between workers born in 1949 and 1950 and that this result does not 
change when we use additional sample selection criteria. The tables also show that attrition in 
later waves (i.e., after 2007) is unrelated to the treatment. 
 
3.2 Measuring retirement expectations and private savings behavior 
Our main interest lies in investigating how the change in the pension system affects the 
retirement expectations and realizations and saving decisions of public sector workers. To elicit 
retirement expectations before the reform took place, we asked respondents in 2007 the 
following survey question: “At what age did you expect to retire five years ago?” To measure the 
development in retirement preferences and expectations after the reform, we asked two questions 
                                                          
7
 Firefighters and ambulance and police personnel still have other retirement schemes that allow early retirement 
between the ages of 55 and 62 with a replacement rate of at least 70%. 
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in the survey annually: (1) “At what age do you expect to definitively stop working?” and 
(2) “What would your pension benefit be as a percentage of your net wage income if you retire at 
the age of 62?” 
There is an extensive literature on retirement expectations and the general consensus 
seems to be that retirement expectations measured this way accurately match realizations 
(Bernheim, 1989, 2009; Dwyer & Hu, 2000; Chan & Stevens, 2004; Benítez-Silva & Dwyer, 
2005). In this paper, we observe expectations for eight years as well as actual retirement 
realizations until 2014 and can therefore examine, in addition to behavioral response to the 
policy reform, how well expectations match retirement realizations. 
 Our survey annually includes several questions on pension savings that enable us to 
analyze such behavioral responses. First, the survey includes a question on whether the 
respondent participates in the Life Course Savings Scheme. Those who do are also asked how 
many months of earlier retirement they plan to finance out of this Life Course Savings Scheme 
(only in the 2009 wave). This direct question will enable us to also disentangle the underlying 
mechanisms driving the adjustments in retirement planning. We return to this later in Section 4. 
Second, the survey asks whether respondents made additional savings arrangements for their 
pension in the past year and how many alternative sources of (pension) wealth they can access. 
These alternative pension products include (1) pensions built up at pension funds other than 
ABP, (2) life annuities, (3) life insurance, (4) savings in excess of €15,000, (5) investments, 
(6) inheritance, and (7) other pension insurance products. Moreover, the survey asks whether the 
respondents has a partner with his or her own income, has a partner with his or her own pension, 
and whether workers have positive net housing wealth (the value of the house minus the 
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mortgage). This enables us to control not only for individual wealth but also for the major 
components of household wealth. 
 
3.3 Descriptive analyses: Comparing the treated and control cohorts 
Since our empirical analyses exploit the sharp discontinuity in pension treatment induced by the 
natural experiment, it is of crucial importance for the internal validity of our natural experimental 
approach that (1) the individuals in the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar in 
order to ascribe the difference in retirement expectations, realizations, and savings behavior 
between the treatment and control groups to the pension reform and (2) the reform was well 
understood and actually created a sharp discontinuity in expectations. 
 First, as already mentioned, while attrition was substantial, the survey participation rates 
of both cohorts are very similar for each year of the panel survey (see Tables B1 and B2 of 
Appendix B). Second, Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups 
for the 2007 wave. While the first two columns show the respective means, the last column tests 
whether the differences are significant. Table 1 confirms that job and personal characteristics and 
the sector in which employees are employed are indeed similar across both cohorts. We also 
performed this test for the subsequent years 2008–2012 and find no significant differences in 
observables between the treated and untreated respondents (results available upon request). 
Concerning personal characteristics, we observe that approximately 67% of public sector 
workers are highly educated, 90% are married, and they are, on average, in good health. The 
more highly educated are overrepresented in the public sector, which is confirmed in other 
(Dutch) data sets. Most respondents are employed in the government (47%) and education (41%) 
sectors and work full time. 
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 Among the set of wealth variables, one is significantly different at conventional levels 
between the control and treatment groups: the response to the question whether individuals 
participated in the tax-facilitated Life Course Savings Scheme. Only 6.4% of the 1949 cohort 
participated in this Life Course Savings Scheme, whereas, for the 1950 cohort, this fraction is 
more than two times higher (about 16%). Because this tax-facilitated program was introduced at 
the same time as the pension reform, the participation rates in the Life Course Savings Scheme 
for the treated can be seen as a direct response to a reduction in savings costs plus the drop in 
pension wealth. For the controls, it is a direct response to a reduction in savings cost. 
 
3.4 The respondents understood the consequences of the reform 
As mentioned at the end of Section 2, the consequences of the reform were communicated 
extensively to the affected cohorts. Moreover, employees receive annually a detailed overview of 
their pension rights that shows them exactly the pension benefits they would receive if they were 
to retire at different ages. The sample means confirm that the respondents had a good overview 
of their pension and the consequences of the reform. Respondents born in 1949 expected, on 
average, a pension benefit at a net replacement rate of 72% if they had to retire at age 62, while 
employees born in 1950 anticipated a replacement rate of 66% at that age. This difference is 
statistically significant and remarkably close to the difference in the actual (gross) replacement 
rates of 70% and 64% for the 1949 and 1950 cohorts, respectively. Figure 1 depicts this 
graphically, with each dot representing the average expected pension benefit for individuals born 
in a specific birth month. The figure confirms once more that the respondents understood the 
consequences of the reform, with a strong discontinuity in the expected pension benefit around 
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the threshold date of January 1, 1950. The same figure for later years displays a similar pattern 
(see Figure A1 of Appendix A). 
 The average response to the retrospective survey question on the respondents’ expected 
retirement age five years ago (measured in 2007) does not differ significantly between the treated 
and control groups. This also becomes clear in Figure 2, a graphical representation of the 
expected retirement age before the reform (in 2002) for workers born in 1949 and 1950. The 
figure shows no clear break around the threshold age.
8
 Things look very different for the 
expected retirement age one year after the reform: those born in 1949 expected, on average, to 
retire at age 62 years and eight months, while those born in 1950 expected to retire at age 63 
years and six months. Figure 3 graphically shows this discontinuity. Note that the expected age 
of retirement reflects both changes in the pension system as well as the respondent’s behavioral 
response to this reform. The fact that the difference in expected retirement ages between the 
treated and controls is close to the 13 months that people must work in addition is surprising, in 
that respect, and suggests that most workers are not willing to sacrifice much current and future 
consumption for previously planned leisure. Note that, in 2007, the respondents were 57 or 58 
and their expectations could change over time. Below we examine this issue more closely. 
 
4. Empirical implementation and results 
4.1 Empirical implementation 
A permanent change in public pension wealth forces workers to reconsider previously made 
retirement and savings decision. Indeed, in the extended life cycle model of Feldstein (1974), 
savings and retirement decisions are jointly determined and (exogenous) changes in public 
                                                          
8
 We additionally performed a Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of the equality of the distribution functions. The test 
indicates significant differences between the distributions of both cohorts.  
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pension wealth induce a “wealth replacement effect” and a “retirement effect”. In our context we 
can write a quasi-reduced form equation for adjustments in retirement expectations as a function 
of the treatment as: 
            (1) 
 
where ERit is the expected retirement age in year t, I(1950) is an indicator for the 1950 cohort, B 
stands for the running variable birth date (expressed in days, normalized to zero on December 
31, 1949, and divided by 100), and X is a set of observed individual characteristics, some of 
which are from the survey and some from the administrative database.
9
 The previous section 
confirmed that, prior to the reform, no differences in retirement expectations existed; that is, the 
expectations in 2002for both cohorts were identical (see Figure 2 and Table A2 of Appendix A). 
Therefore, we may equally well estimate (1) in levels of ERit. We perform both estimations and 
show that the results are very similar. In the next sections, we consider both short-run effects (t = 
2007) and longer-run effects t = 2008, …, 2011. 
The reform differentially affected the two cohorts and entailed two changes: (i) a 
reduction in public pension wealth that applied only the 1950 cohort and (ii) a tax-facilitated 
savings program that effectively changed the return of additional savings due to lower costs of 
savings. The latter change applied to both cohorts. The treatment effect (parameter 1) is 
therefore the compound effect of the direct effect of the change in pension wealth on the labor 
supply and the indirect effect of additional savings. This indirect savings effect is a direct 
                                                          
9
 Note that, strictly speaking, a regression discontinuity design also requires differential age (B) trends for the treated 
and control groups. Additional regressions with differential age trends do not change the results at all. Indeed, 
Figure 2 shows no age trend effects.  
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measure of the degree of substitution between public and private wealth and consists of an effect 
caused by the drop in pension wealth plus an effect caused by lower savings costs. 
Similarly, for savings S, we can write 
            (2) 
Rather than the actual amount of savings, we observe whether an individual has saved in various 
ways to finance retirement (see Section 3). For S, we distinguish whether an individual 
participated in the Life Course Savings Scheme and whether they made (other) additional 
savings in the past years to supplement their pension.
10
 Note that the Life Course Savings 
Scheme introduced at the time of the reform was accessible to both cohorts and, therefore, 1 
measures the additional effect for the treated (1950) cohort. The variables S and dER are jointly 
determined and, therefore, besides our (single) instrument, more information is required to tease 
out the direct and indirect effects contained in 1 (and 1). Fortunately, the 2009 survey also 
contains a question about the number of months the participants in the Life Course Savings 
Scheme expected to finance from this program. Via this question, we can obtain an estimate of 
the indirect savings effect induced by the reform. We will return to this issue below. 
4.2 Short-run effects of the reform 
4.2.1 Retirement expectations one year after the reform 
The first two columns of Table 2 provide the ordinary least squares (OLS) results of equation (1) 
for 2007. The treatment dummy refers to the average treatment effect of the reform for the cohort 
born in 1950. From a comparison between Columns 1 and 2, one can conclude that the addition 
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 We observe a range of other measures, such as whether the respondents have positive net housing wealth and 
whether their partner has an income (see Section 3). These are unlikely to be a direct response to the pension reform 
and therefore only used in a later section, when we look at heterogeneous effects.  
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of controls does not alter the parameter estimate of interest. This result once more confirms that 
the treatment and control groups, besides birth year, are very similar. The table also includes the 
regression where the left-hand side of (1) is replaced by the retirement expectation in 2007 
(Columns 3 and 4). A priori, one would not expect to find differences in the effect of the 
treatment dummy. After all, in Section 3 (Table 1), we already note that retirement expectations 
five years ago (2002) were virtually identical for the two cohorts. Indeed, the coefficients of the 
treatment dummy are very similar. 
 The coefficient of interest (1) indicates that, in the short run, workers affected by the 
reform expect to work about 0.88 years (about 10.5 months) longer. Since the drop in pension 
wealth is equivalent to 13 months of earlier retirement, our results imply that the average treated 
worker compensates for the drop in pension rights mainly at the expense of leisure in retirement 
(and only marginally decreases pre- or post-retirement consumption, i.e., the remaining 2.5 
months). It is important to note (see also Section 4.1) that this is the total average treatment 
effect on the treated and it consists of two opposing forces: the adjustment in retirement years 
(direct effect) when no additional savings are made plus the effect of additional savings in the 
Life Course Savings Scheme to compensate for the drop in pension rights (indirect effect). 
 Figure 3 confirms that the size of the effect of the reform is a little less than one 
additional year labor supply. However, a comparison with Figure 2 also shows that the controls 
(1949 cohort) adjusted their expectations slightly upward. This could be caused by control’s 
anticipation of further reforms that could also affect their pension wealth. The regression results 
in Column 2 show that the higher educated and those with higher incomes retire sooner than the 
others. 
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4.2.2 Savings one year after the reform 
Table 3 provides the results for two of our savings measures that we expect to be responsive to 
the reform: whether individuals participated in the tax-facilitated Life Course Savings Scheme 
(Columns 1 and 2) and whether they had extra pension savings over and above the ABP pension 
in the previous year (Columns 3 and 4). Figure 4 gives a graphical representation. Columns 1 and 
2 indicate that the probability of participating in the Life Course Savings Scheme is about 8 
percentage points higher for the treated cohort. This effect is virtually unchanged when we add 
regressors. Of these regressors, individuals’ wages and the number of years they contributed to 
the pension fund have a notable and significant effect. Taking the mean of these variables into 
account (see Table 1), we can conclude that the wage effect is by far the dominant factor in 
explaining participation in the Life Course Savings Scheme.
11
 Apparently, the wage effect 
reflects the ability to save. Columns 3 and 4 show no significant treatment effects on extra 
pension savings.
12
 A further look at the other coefficients in Column 4 reveals that the effect of 
the number of years of contribution to the pension system has a sizeable effect, its coefficient 
being more than three times that in Column 2. This result suggests that the number of years of 
contribution to the pension fund is likely to reflect the need to save and that these savings already 
existed prior to the reform. In sum, the drop in pension wealth and the reduction in savings costs 
primarily affected savings via the Life Course Savings Scheme. Wages have a strong 
independent effect (irrespective of treatment status) on the decision to participate in the tax-
exempt Life Course Savings Scheme. The number of years of contribution to the pension fund 
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 A one-standard-deviation change in the logarithm of wages (mean 10.7) results in a change of 0.025 (2.5 
percentage points). For the difference between the top (11.10) and bottom deciles (9.98), this results in an effect of 
10%.  
12
 We also looked at other forms of savings in the data. None of these regressions resulted in significant treatment 
effects.  
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has an additional, independent effect on both participation in the Life Course Savings Scheme 
and additional savings to supplement pension income. 
 The Life Course Savings Scheme, introduced at the same time as the pension reform, 
facilitated savings at lower costs for both the treated and control groups. The treated were thus 
confronted with a drop in their pension wealth and an opportunity to save at lower cost. The 
controls were only affected by the latter change in the system. Observed changes in the (Life 
Course Savings Scheme) savings of the controls are therefore most likely in response to the 
reduction in the cost of savings, while observed changes in the savings of the treated are the sum 
of the savings increase induced by the drop in public pension wealth and the savings induced by 
the lower cost of savings. For the participants in the Life Course Savings Scheme, the 2009 
survey also includes a question about the number of months they planned to finance from this 
savings account. Figure 5 presents this data graphically. The smoothed line indicates that those 
born in 1949 planned to finance nine months’ earlier retirement from their savings account. The 
average for the affected (1950) cohort is about four months more. This result is confirmed in 
Table 4. These four months can thus be interpreted as a pure substitution effect between private 
and public pension wealth, that is, a pure crowding out effect due to the drop in public pension 
wealth. The figure also suggests that treated workers participating in the Life Course Savings 
Scheme planned to fully counter the intended effect of the reform on retirement (13 months later 
retirement). About four months can be ascribed to the drop in pension wealth induced by the 
reform and about nine months due to reduced savings costs (tax exemption). 
The results of Table 2 indicate that, on average, the treated work about 10.5 months 
longer (0.879*12 = 10.55 months). Of the treated sample, about 16% of those who participated 
in the Life Course Savings Scheme intended not to work 13 months longer (see Figure 5) but, 
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rather, stick to the previously set retirement age. This implies that the treated who did not 
participate in the program expected to work 10.55/0.84 = 12.6 months longer, that is, almost 
completely the intended effect of the reform. Hence, these workers were not willing to sacrifice 
future pension income for more leisure years in retirement or to sacrifice their current income but 
predominantly countered the drop in public pension wealth by sacrificing leisure (retirement 
years). The results of Table 3 indicate that wages are the dominant factor in explaining the 
decision to participate in the Life Course Savings Scheme. In light of the above, this could imply 
that primarily lower-wage workers are induced to postpone retirement. What is problematic, 
however, is that these workers generally also have worse health.13 Indeed, a regression of the 
logarithm of wages on sickness and a set of other controls shows a significant negative 
association between wages and sickness (results available upon request). This finding suggests 
that financial constraints rather than a low disutility of work are at play in the decision to 
postpone retirement. 
 
4.3 Longer-run effects 
4.3.1 Developments in retirement expectations (2008–2011) 
The above results show strong initial responses to the reform on retirement. Of interest is 
whether retirement expectations change in the longer run and, ultimately, whether expectations 
match realizations. Starting with expectations in the longer run, we estimate model (1) for the 
years 2008 to 2011. It is important to note that our longer-run analyses focus on respondents who 
responded at the start of the panel, because we wish to follow the expectations of the respondents 
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 See also the vast literature on the strong association between socioeconomic status and health (e.g., Banks et al., 
2006).   
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in our original sample over time. We therefore do not use the additional response due to the 
renewed invitation to participate in the Internet survey in later years.
14
 
 Note also that those born in 1949 (controls) will have turned 62 in 2012, the age at which 
this cohort could retire with a 70% replacement rate. This cohort could also retire at earlier ages 
with lower replacement rates. This holds also for the 1950 cohort, who had to be 63 (in 2013) to 
receive a 70% replacement rate. In March 2011 (when the survey was held), 13.8% of the 1949 
cohort and 3.7% of the 1950 cohort had retired. After 2011, these fractions rapidly increased 
(notably for the 1949 cohort; we return to examine actual retirement patterns in the next sub-
section). We therefore restrict ourselves to retirement expectations in the period 2008–2011. 
Model (1) could be estimated for the expected retirement age (ERit) or the change in the 
expected age of retirement relative to 2002 (dERit = ERit - ERi2002). Below, we discuss the 
results for the change in the expected retirement age, dERit, t = 2007, …, 2011. Table A2 in 
Appendix A reports the result for the retirement expectation levels, that is, ERit, t = 2007, …, 
2011. The results of these regressions are very similar to the results discussed below. 
 The first column of Table 5 repeats the results of the Column 1 of Table 2, while the 
other columns show the results for later years. The most important result is that the longer-run 
treatment effects are not much different from the short-run effect. Therefore, the readjustments 
took place shortly after the reform and the workers stuck to these in later years. The consistence 
in the treatment effects can most likely be explained due to the fact we are analyzing the 
behavior of older workers confronted with substantial changes in pension wealth only a few 
years prior to their initially planned retirement. The situation could be different for younger 
cohorts. The treatment indicator is somewhat smaller for 2009. For 2010 and 2011, the effects 
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 We also conducted our longer-run analyses on the dynamics in retirement expectations (ERit) using these 
additional responses (results available upon request). The results did not change substantially. 
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are again closer to expectations in 2007. Figure 6 (retirement expectations) and Figure A1 
(retirement benefit expectations) provide more information that could explain the patterns. 
Figure 6 shows that the smaller effect in 2009 is primarily due to the higher expected retirement 
ages of the controls (born in 1949). In 2009, the consequences of the financial crises for pensions 
became clearer and the controls might have expected that, sooner or later, these would also affect 
their pension wealth and eligibility conditions for early retirement.
15
 This situation is also 
reflected in the retirement benefit expectations for 2009 (Figure A1). The controls (and the 
treated) also adjusted their benefit expectations downward. For the later years (2010 and 2011), 
the expectations of both cohorts rose again, coming closer to the 0.8 years in 2007. This could be 
due to the very early retirement of some workers, increasing the average of those remaining in 
the sample. Alternatively, in the aftermath of the financial crises, both cohorts could have 
adjusted their retirement expectations upward and benefits expectations downward. Indeed, the 
plots in Figure A1 show substantially lower benefit expectations for both cohorts. While the idea 
of a more pessimistic outlook could be a plausible explanation, one still cannot dismiss the idea 
that actual retirement could influence the patterns. After all, those with relatively high benefit 
levels could have decided to retire earlier, reducing the average expected benefit levels in the 
remaining sample. 
 
4.3.2 Retirement realizations 
The survey data are linked to administrative data containing information on actual retirement up 
to March 2014, which implies that those born in the first months of 1949 have turned 65, the 
statutory retirement age. Therefore, besides differences in pension rights and eligibility 
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 The 2008 recession led to substantial deficits in the ABP fund, which led to temporary cutbacks in pension 
benefits and withholds indexation. This was communicated to the workers and displayed in the media. 
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conditions, the pure age effect will also lead to substantially higher retirement ages for the 
controls. Figure 7 confirms this effect. The retirement rates of the 1949 cohort range from about 
70% to more than 90% for those born in the first quarter of the year. In contrast, the retirement 
rates of the 1950 cohort are 40–50 percentage points lower. The regression results in Table 6 
show, controlling for age, that the pure treatment effect is about 23 percentage points. This 
finding indicates that the reform did what it was intended to do: postpone retirement. Table 7 
shows the retirement age distribution for the two cohorts. At each age, the retirement rates of the 
controls are much higher, but also note that the retirement rates of the treated seems to lag by 
about one year. More specifically, the fraction of treated retired at age 61 is about the same as the 
retirement rate of the controls at age 60. The same holds for the other ages of the treated, with an 
exception for age 64. We only observe actual retirement up to March 1, 2014, implying that, in 
March 2014, the treated born in the first quarter was 64 while the rest would turn 64 in the course 
of the year. Each year, the retirement dates are mostly concentrated at the start of the  year and 
after the summer vacation. Therefore, it is important to realize that, for the treated, the fraction of 
64-year-old retirees could be lower than the comparable fraction of 64-year-olds among the 
controls, whose numbers are based on the entire calendar year (2013). Nevertheless, to conclude, 
the results in Table 7 confirm that the reform postponed retirement by about one year, as 
intended. 
 The above results again suggest that those affected by the reform chose to work longer 
rather than sacrifice pension income for earlier retirement. In earlier sections, we also saw that 
about 16% of the affected cohort chose to participate in the tax-facilitated Life Course Savings 
Scheme and that these workers intended to fully counter the effect of the reform. Unfortunately, 
those participating in the Life Course Savings Scheme were not considered as retired when they 
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took a self-financed leave before the actual date of retirement. We therefore cannot check this 
with the administrative data, but it is conceivable that a fraction of the workers observed in the 
data as retiring later could, in fact, have stopped working earlier. 
 The effectiveness of the program in postponing retirement could have to do with how the 
program was implemented. It was announced late in the game for the workers in our sample and 
implemented only a few months after its announcement. Consequently, not all workers may have 
gathered sufficient means to fully counter the reform with additional savings, either because they 
were not in a (financial) position to save sufficiently or because they were not willing to sacrifice 
current consumption. Indeed, the savings regressions (see the discussion involving Table 3) show 
income as an important factor in participation in the Life Course Savings Scheme and that the 
participants fully countered the drop in public pension wealth with additional savings. 
Consequently, the behavioral response to the reform is likely to differ across subgroups, notably 
those with higher wages and other sources of wealth. We address this issue below. 
 
4.4 Heterogeneous effects 
We run separate OLS regressions on the different subsamples to examine heterogeneous 
responses to the reform. For each subsample, we look at short-term (2007) retirement 
expectations, participation in the Life Course Savings Scheme, and retirement realizations in 
March 2014. We look at two sets of variables that are related to retirement planning and savings 
behavior: the set of wage, education, health, and wealth variables (A) and a set of individual risk 
aversion and financial decision making variables (B). 
The definitions of the set of wage, education, health, and wealth variables are self–
explanatory and the inclusion of heterogeneity analyses with these variables can be easily 
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justified. One can expect that workers with higher wages and more education overall have 
accumulated more private wealth and therefore have more opportunities to maintain current and 
post-retirement consumption levels while keeping leisure years in retirement close to those 
initially planned (i.e., before the reform). The costs of prolonged work are higher for those in 
poor health and one might therefore, at first instance, expect those in poor health to retire earlier, 
that is, have lower treatment effects. Note, however, that the reform could have impacted health 
(for such findings on mental health, see DeGrip et al., 2012) and, therefore, the results could at 
best be interpreted as an association. Previous research, furthermore, shows that the retirement 
decisions of members within families are related (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier, 2004) and that 
the financial impact of the pension reform is larger for workers who have to provide for a family 
and whose partner does not contribute to the household (pension) income (Bloemen et al., 2015). 
We therefore also run separate regressions for whether the respondents indicated that they had a 
partner who would also receive a pension.
16
 
The set of variables related to financial decision making variables consists of risk 
aversion, financial risk aversion, and the self-reported capability to make decisions in complex 
situations. Risk attitude plays an important role in intertemporal decision making under 
uncertainty and could, therefore, also affect the degree of substitution between private and public 
pension wealth. A lack of the respondents’ ability to make decisions in complex situations is 
expected to lead to procrastination and lower levels of wealth accumulation (Banks et al., 2010). 
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 We also ran regressions for the other income and savings variables (see Table 1). These regressions did not 
provide additional insights. Moreover, we ran several other regressions for the partner’s treatment status, the 
partner’s wage income, and the number of children. We found that the retirement expectations, actual retirement 
behavior, and savings decisions have no impact of the size of the treatment effect (results available on request). This 
is not surprising, because most female partners in this age cohort have part-time jobs and little pension wealth of 
their own.
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A measure of risk aversion is derived from the responses to the survey question, “How do 
you see yourself: Are you, generally, a person who takes risks or do you try to avoid risks? 
Please self-grade your choice (ranging between 0 (extremely risk averse) and 10 (extremely 
willing to take risks)).” We reverse the scale of the answers and consider people to have low risk 
aversion when they give a grade above five (upper quartile).
17
 The financial decision making 
variable is derived from the same question, adapted to financial decision making. The capability 
to make difficult decisions is measured by the survey question, “To what extent are you 
generally able to make a financial decision, even when the decisions are of a complex nature? 
Please self-grade your choice (ranging between 0 (extremely unable) and 10 ((extremely 
able))).” We construct an indicator for the bottom quartile, that is, those less able to make a 
decision in such situations. The level of item non-response is quite high for these variables. 
 The top panel of Table 8 shows the results for short-run retirement expectations, the 
middle panel the results for participation in the Life Course Savings Scheme, and the bottom 
panel the retirement status in March 2014. The p-values in the penultimate row of each panel are 
based on the coefficient of the treatment dummy and the heterogeneity variable in fully 
interacted models. Below, we briefly discuss the main findings. 
For changes in retirement expectations (top panel of Table 8), we find a stronger 
treatment effect for the risk averse, meaning that these workers generally extended their working 
life much longer than the others did. For none of the other variables (wage, education, partner’s 
pension, and health) do we find differential treatment effects. Note that this does not imply that 
these variables play no role in expectation formation (cf., see the coefficients for wages and 
education in Table 2). The second panel of Table 8 shows the results for participation in the Life 
Course Savings Scheme. Again, the response to the drop in pension wealth does not differ by 
                                                          
17
 In the literature, this question has been used extensively to elicit risk preferences (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2011).  
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respondent income, education, partner’s pension, or health. We do, however, observe sizeable 
and significant differences between different subgroups related to financial decision making 
variables. Basically, the risk averse and those with low capabilities of making difficult decisions 
do not respond to the drop in pension wealth. The results for risk aversion may seem 
counterintuitive at first. However, it should be noted that the Life Course Savings account is not 
like a traditional savings account but often involves a mix between traditional savings and 
investments in stocks or bonds and thus involves more risk than traditional saving products. The 
finding for decision making in complex situations could be due to the fact that respondents who 
have difficulties making decisions in financially complex situations often procrastinate in such 
situations and accumulate less wealth (Banks et al., 2010). We also run a simple regression that 
relates (financial) risk aversion to wages and income. These regressions (results available upon 
request) show that risk aversion is negatively associated with wages and education. 
Finally, for actual retirement status in 2014, we find strong differential effects for wages, 
education, and health.
18
 The treatment effects of those with higher wages, more education, and 
fewer sickness days are substantially lower than the effects of their lower-wage, less educated, 
and sicker counterparts. We find no effects for the financial decision making variables, while 
they appear to be important for participation in the Life Course Savings Scheme. It is important 
to note that the treated who participate in the Life Course Savings Scheme are not officially 
registered as retired when they take up funds from this program to finance retirement. We should 
therefore also not expect to see an effect on retirement realizations. The lack of significant 
effects for the financial decision making variables, however, could also suggest that, ultimately, 
when it comes to actual retirement, it is not participation in the Life Course Savings Scheme per 
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 We also looked at differential effects by self-reported bad health, a depression indicator derived from the CESD-8 
score, and subjective survival probabilities. Of these variables, only the latter showed significantly different 
treatment effects.   
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se but also the need to have sufficient other means to cushion the impact of the reduction in 
pension wealth on retirement. To test for this, one needs to further stratify the groups, but we ran 
into power problems and therefore did not pursue this further.
19
 A further question that remains 
is why do we find significant heterogeneous treatment effects by wage, education, and health for 
retirement realizations and why are the same heterogeneous responses not statistically significant 
for retirement expectations in 2007? Note that the retirement status is observed at a point in time 
and thus looks at the differences between those who have retired and those who have not at a 
point in time, while our retirement expectations variable measures the change in expectations for 
all workers (some of whom may have retired by 2011 and some who have not). 
 To summarize the above, we find heterogeneous effects for different subgroups but 
primarily for retirement realizations in 2014 and participation in the Life Course Savings 
Scheme. The most notable differences in actual retirement behavior are found for the wage, 
education, and health variables and, for savings, the variables related to risk aversion and 
(financial) decision making in complex situations. 
 
5. Summary, discussion, and conclusion 
This paper looks at the response of retirement expectations, actual retirement, and savings to an 
unanticipated reform of the pension system that was implemented in January 2006. The reform 
affected workers born in 1950 (or later) and led to a substantial loss in pension wealth. Those 
born prior to 1950 (controls) could retire at the age of 62 with a replacement rate of 70% of the 
average of wages earned in the past 10 years. The affected cohort in our sample (treated) had to 
work 13 months longer to obtain the same replacement rate or they could retire at age 62 with a 
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 Note that, besides being able to save sufficient amounts of money to finance earlier retirement, they also hold 
more alternative sources of wealth from which they can finance earlier retirement. 
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replacement rate of 64%. At the same time, the government launched a tax-facilitated savings 
program, the Life Course Savings Scheme, that permitted tax-free savings up to 12% of one’s 
annual income. This program was open to all workers (treated and controls). 
We find strong behavioral responses to the reform. The expectation data show that, one 
year after the reform, affected workers expected, on average, to work about 10.5 months longer. 
The drop in pension wealth is equivalent to 13 months of earlier retirement, so our results 
suggest that the average treated worker makes up for the drop in their pension rights mainly at 
the expense of leisure in retirement and, to a lesser extent, by decreasing post-retirement 
consumption. The difference in retirement expectations between the treated and control groups 
remained stable in later years and is close to the differences in actual retirement rates observed in 
2014. Observed retirement patterns by age indicate that the affected workers work an additional 
year, as intended by the program. It thus appears that that the reform was very effective in raising 
the retirement age for the larger part of the sample. 
 The savings rates of the treated, as measured by participation in the tax-facilitated 
retirement savings program, are around 16%, which is more than twice the savings rate of the 
controls. Those in the control and treated cohorts participating in the program stated that they 
expected to finance about nine months and 13 months of earlier retirement, respectively. The 
nine months’ savings of the controls can be interpreted as the response to a reduction in savings 
costs (due to the introduction of the Life Course Savings Scheme). For the treated, the savings 
effect is the sum of increased private savings induced by the drop in public pension wealth and 
additional savings induced by the lower cost of savings. The four months’ difference between the 
treated and controls can therefore be interpreted as the pure savings effect implied by the drop in 
pension wealth, that is, the pure crowding out effect between public and private wealth. All in 
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all, this means that the treated participating in the Life Course Savings Scheme are likely to fully 
counter the drop in public pension wealth by additional savings in the Life Course Savings 
Scheme. 
 The effectiveness of the reform for the larger part of the workers could have to do with its 
implementation. The reform was unexpected, implemented shortly after its announcement, and 
late in the game for the workers studied here. At the time of the implementation in January 2006, 
the affected cohort in our sample was 56 years old, leaving them with six years to save a one-
year leave if they desired retiring at age 62 rather than at age 63. It is conceivable that this was 
not possible for the larger part of the workers (i.e., the 84% of the treated who did not participate 
in the savings program) unless they were willing to sacrifice (much of their) current consumption 
to finance earlier retirement. These workers thus had to face the choice to work longer and/or 
accept a loss in post-retirement consumption. Our findings indicate that workers not participating 
in the savings program chose to work substantially longer. It thus appears that, for these workers, 
the stabilization of post-retirement income/consumption was the main motive and this was 
derived at no loss in current consumption. This result is consistent with the very low substitution 
rates between private and public wealth for older workers faced with reforms at the end of their 
working life. 
The 16% of workers born in 1950 who participated in the Life Course Savings Scheme 
stuck to their previously planned retirement date. These workers were mostly high-wage workers 
who also held more alternative sources of wealth, allowing them to absorb the loss in pension 
wealth with private wealth. For these workers, private wealth fully crowded out public pension 
wealth. Those not participating in the Life Course Savings Scheme expected to postpone 
retirement with 12.5 months. These were generally lower-wage workers who, on average, were 
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also in worse health. This result suggests that the zero substitution rate between private and 
public health is primarily due to financial constraints rather than a low disutility of work. The 
question is whether the stronger labor supply effects of the pension reform on particular workers 
in worse health are really desirable from a government perspective. A further unintended side 
effect of the introduction of the tax-facilitated savings plan is that, in particular, high-wage 
earners who participated in the savings program but who were not affected by the pension reform 
(the controls) decided to retire even sooner than initially planned. 
Are the results generalizable to other countries, other sectors, and other workers? 
Obviously, our findings cannot be generalized to younger cohorts that are also affected by the 
reform. Cohorts born, say, in the 1960s have more time to accumulate private wealth and, 
therefore, the effects of the reform will likely be smaller for these cohorts and, presumably, 
lower-wage workers could, in the longer run, be able to compensate for the loss in public pension 
wealth by increased savings. Additionally, it is unclear whether the same extension of working 
life can be expected in other sectors of the economy. The public sector is atypical in the sense 
that workers are, on average, much more educated and face different working conditions than 
workers in other sectors of the economy. In sectors with strenuous working conditions, such as 
construction, workers’ health can limit working life extension and, therefore, the effect of a 
similar reform on retirement rates could be smaller in the first instance. However, workers in 
these sectors are also less educated, have lower wages, and are likely to have less wealth to 
compensate for losses in pension wealth. 
 The essential lesson from this paper is that reforms announced late in the game have 
substantial effects on retirement patterns, but most of the effect is confined to workers who are 
financially constrained and who cannot counter public pension wealth losses with private wealth. 
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These are generally lower-wage workers with lower education levels and in worse health. This 
information is relevant for workers in all countries, irrespective of the specifics of the country’s 
pension system. 
 
Literature  
Alessie, R., Angelini, V., & Van Santen, P. (2013). Pension wealth and household savings in 
Europe: Evidence from SHARELIFE. European Economic Review, 63, 308-328. 
Attanasio, O & A. Bruggiavini (2003) Social Security and Household’s Saving, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, vol.118, n.3 
Attanasio, O. P., & Rohwedder, S. (2003). Pension wealth and household saving: Evidence from 
pension reforms in the United Kingdom. The American Economic Review, 93(5), 1499-
1521. 
Banks, J., Marmot, M, Oldfield, Z and J Smit (2006). Disease and Disadvantage in the United 
States and in England, Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA) 
295(17):2037-2045, May 3, 2006 (with James Banks, Michael Marmot, and Zoe 
Oldfield) 
Banks, J., Emmerson, C., & Tetlow, G. (2007). Healthy retirement or unhealthy inactivity: How 
important are financial incentives in explaining retirement. Journal of Public 
Economics, 89, 427-440. 
Banks, J., o’Dea, C., & Oldfield, Z. (2010). Cognitive function, numeracy and retirement saving 
trajectories. The Economic Journal, 120(548). 
Benitez-Silva, H., & Dwyer, D. S. (2005). The rationality of retirement expectations and the role 
of new information. Review of Economics and Statistics, 87(3), 587-592. 
Bernheim, B. D. (1989). The Timing of Retirement: A Comparison of Expectations and 
Realizations. In The Economics of Aging (pp. 335-358). University of Chicago Press. 
Bernheim, B. D. (2002). Taxation and saving. Handbook of public economics, 3, 1173-1249. 
Bernheim, B. D. (2009). 11 The Timing of Retirement: A Comparison of Expectations and 
Realizations. The Economics of Aging, 335. 
Bloemen, H., Hochguertel, S., & Zweerink, J. (2015). Joint Retirement of Couples: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment. IZA DP No. 8861. 
35 
 
Bottazzi, R., Jappelli, T., & Padula, M. (2006). Retirement expectations, pension reforms, and 
their impact on private wealth accumulation. Journal of Public Economics, 90(12), 2187-
2212. 
Bovenberg, L., & Gradus, R (2015). Reforming occupational pension schemes: the case of the 
Netherlands. Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 18(3), 244-257.  
Chan, S., & Stevens, A. H. (2004). Do changes in pension incentives affect retirement? A 
longitudinal study of subjective retirement expectations. Journal of Public 
Economics, 88(7), 1307-1333. 
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D., Sunde, U., Schupp, J., & Wagner, G. G. (2011). Individual 
risk attitudes: Measurement, determinants, and behavioral consequences. Journal of the 
European Economic Association, 9(3), 522-550. 
Dwyer, D. S., & Hu, J. (2000). Retirement expectations and realizations: The role of health 
shocks and economic factors. Forecasting retirement needs and retirement wealth, 274-
287. 
Euwals, R.W., D.J. van Vuuren, and R.P. Wolthoff (2006). `Early retirement behavior in the 
Netherlands: Evidence from a policy reform.' Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2006-
021/3 
Feldstein, M. (1974). Social security, induced retirement, and aggregate capital 
accumulation. Journal of Political Economy, 82(5), 905-926. 
Feldstein, M., & Pellechio, A. (1979). Social Security and Household Accumulation: New 
Microeconometric Evidence. Review of Economics and Statistics, 61(3). 361-368. 
Gale, W. G. (1998). The effects of pensions on household wealth: A reevaluation of theory and 
evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 106(4), 706-723. 
Grip, A. D., Lindeboom, M., & Montizaan, R. (2012). Shattered dreams: the effects of changing 
the pension system late in the game. The Economic Journal, 122(559), 1-25. 
Gustman, A.L., and TL. Steinmeier. "Social security, pensions and retirement behaviour within 
the family." Journal of Applied Econometrics 19.6 (2004): 723-737. 
Lindeboom, M., and Kerkhofs, M. (2009). Health and work of the elderly: subjective health 
measures, reporting errors and endogeneity in the relationship between health and 
work. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24(6), 1024-1046. 
Lindeboom, M. and M. Melnychuk (2015), Mental Health and Asset Choices, Annales 
36 
 
d’Économie et de Statistique, 119(120), 65-94. 
McFall, B. H. (2011). Crash and wait? The impact of the Great Recession on the retirement plans 
of older Americans. The American Economic Review, 101(3), 40-44. 
Montizaan, R., Cörvers, F., & De Grip, A. (2010). The effects of pension rights and retirement 
age on training participation: Evidence from a natural experiment. Labour 
Economics, 17(1), 240-247. 
Montizaan, R., De Grip, A., Cörvers, F., & Dohmen, T. (2015). The impact of negatively 
reciprocal inclinations on worker behavior: Evidence from a retrenchment of pension 
rights. Management Science, 62(3), 668-681. 
Montizaan, R. M., & Vendrik, M. C. (2014). Misery loves company: Exogenous shocks in 
retirement expectations and social comparison effects on subjective well-being. Journal 
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 97, 1-26. 
OECD, 2015. Pensions at a glance 2015: OECD and G20 indicators. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2015-en 
Radloff, L.S. (1977). ‘The CES-D scale: a self-report depression scale for research in the general 
population’, Applied Psychological Measurement, vol. 1(3), pp. 385–401. 
Rouwendal, J. (2009). Housing wealth and household portfolios in an ageing society. De 
Economist, 157(1), 1–48. 
Statistics Netherlands (2009). `Labour force survey.' Statline 
 
 
  
37 
 
Table 1 Characteristics for the affected and not affected respondent (2007) 
 
Affected by 
the reform 
Not affected 
by the 
reform 
Min Max 
P-value
1
 
Personal characteristics 
  
  
 Low education level 
 
0.132 0.125 0 1 0.835 
High education level 
 
0.671 0.681 0 1 0.532 
Married 
  
0.904 0.919 0 1 0.661 
Number of sick days 
 
9.47 8.89 0 250 0.741 
        
Job characteristics        
# years contributed to pension fund 30.262 31.762 10 45.579 0.565 
Log wage  10.788 10.801 9.69 12.89 0.748 
Number of contractual work hours 0.996 0.996 0.26 1.25 0.945 
        
Sectors        
Government   0.481 0.452 0 1 0.756 
Education   0.446 0.479 0 1 0.618 
Privatized 0.073 0.069 0 1 0.715   
Income and savings 
    
  
 Life course savings 0.155 0.064 0 1 0.000 
Extra pension savings in previous year 0.254 0.210 0 1 0.191  
Partner with own income 0.749 0.728 0 1 0.154 
Partner with own pension 0.571 0.572 0 1 0.816 
positive net housing wealth 0.687 0.684 0 1 0.271 
Number of alternative wealth sources 2.365 2.359 0 9 0.702 
      
Retirement expectations      
Expected retirement benefit 66.725 72.272 30 135 0.000 
Expected retirement age  63.472 62.734 57 70 0.000  
Expected retirement age before reform 61.390 61.489 53 70 0.620 
1 The last column reports the p-values of the treatment dummy from a regression of the variable in 
question on treatment and age. 
  
38 
 
Table 2 Expected age of retirement in 2007 and the difference between the expected age of 
retirement in 2007 and 2002: OLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: ER(2007)-ER(2002) 
Change in Retirement 
expectations  
ER(2007) 
 Expected Retirement Age 2007 
     
Treatment dummy 0.845
***
 0.879
***
 0.814
***
 0.814
***
 
 (0.102) (0.102) (0.081) (0.081) 
Birth date / 1000 -0.042 -0.047 -0.208 -0.274 
 (0.240) (0.239) (0.194) (0.192) 
Birthdate squared -1.463
**
 -1.426
**
 -0.144 -0.242 
 (0.626) (0.627) (0.511) (0.505) 
Married  0.264
***
  0.057 
  (0.097)  (0.079) 
Low educated  -0.015  -0.229
***
 
  (0.102)  (0.077) 
High educated  -0.205
**
  0.063 
  (0.086)  (0.068) 
Wage (ln)  -0.385
***
  0.124 
  (0.124)  (0.103) 
Number of contribution years to 
the pension fund 
 0.028
***
  -0.052
***
 
  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Constant 1.313
***
 4.624
***
 62.701
***
 62.993
***
 
 (0.065) (1.322) (0.050) (1.099) 
Observations 6605 6476 6702 6569 
Adjusted R
2
 0.041 0.062 0.046 0.093 
Standard errors in parentheses. Other control variables included in Columns 2 and 4: sector dummies. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3 Savings in 2007: results from a linear probability model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Life course savings Extra pension savings  
in previous year 
Treatment dummy 0.082
***
 0.083
***
 0.027 0.028 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) 
Birth date / 1000 0.026 0.020 0.047 0.026 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.050) (0.049) 
Birth date squared 0.042 0.030 -0.013 -0.022 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.131) (0.129) 
Married  0.016  0.022 
  (0.014)  (0.018) 
Low educated  -0.004  -0.061
***
 
  (0.013)  (0.017) 
High educated  0.018  0.019 
  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Wage (ln)  0.090
***
  0.010 
  (0.022)  (0.026) 
Number of contribution years to 
the pension fund 
 -0.003
***
  -0.010
***
 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Constant 0.067
***
 -0.843
***
 0.219
***
 0.393 
 (0.009) (0.229) (0.013) (0.271) 
Observations 5245 5244 6645 6633 
Adjusted R
2
 0.020 0.039 0.002 0.026 
Standard errors in parentheses. Other control variables included in Columns 2 and 4: sector dummies. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4 Months early retirement financed from the life course savings program in 2009: 
OLS results 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: Months early retirement financed from the 
life course savings program 
 Column 1 Column 2 
Treatment dummy 4.241
**
 4.323
**
 
 (1.748) (1.830) 
Birth date / 1000 0.476 -0.196 
 (4.168) (4.287) 
Birth date squared 3.596 0.728 
 (10.846) (11.180) 
Married  0.781 
  (1.595) 
Low educated  -1.111 
  (1.722) 
High educated  1.979 
  (1.204) 
Wage (ln)  -1.393 
  (1.530) 
Number of contribution 
years to the pension 
fund 
 -0.092 
  (0.081) 
Constant 8.972
***
 25.255 
 (1.336) (17.126) 
Observations 601 589 
Adjusted R
2
 0.030 0.046 
Standard errors in parentheses. Other control variables included in Column 2: sector dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of observations is lower as we focus in this table only on workers who participate in 
the life course savings program.  
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Table 5 Longer run effects in retirement expectations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ER(t)-ER(2002) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Treatment 
dummy 
0.879
***
 0.803
***
 0.603
***
 0.655
***
 0.753
***
 
 (0.102) (0.139) (0.146) (0.158) (0.177) 
Birth date / 1000 -0.047 -0.201 0.183 0.487 0.410 
 (0.239) (0.327) (0.348) (0.373) (0.428) 
Birthdate squared -1.426
**
 -0.806 -0.741 -1.498 -0.487 
 (0.627) (0.856) (0.908) (0.991) (1.142) 
Married 0.264
***
 0.443
***
 0.355
**
 0.525
***
 0.489
***
 
 (0.097) (0.142) (0.147) (0.169) (0.183) 
Low educated -0.015 0.123 0.007 0.136 0.078 
 (0.102) (0.140) (0.157) (0.176) (0.245) 
High educated -0.205
**
 -0.299
***
 -0.324
**
 -0.363
***
 -0.204 
 (0.086) (0.114) (0.132) (0.139) (0.155) 
Wage (ln) -0.385
***
 -0.243 -0.224 -0.166 -0.385
*
 
 (0.124) (0.168) (0.186) (0.195) (0.224) 
Number of 
contribution 
years to the 
pension fund 
0.028
***
 0.026
***
 0.032
***
 0.023
**
 0.011 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
Constant 4.624
***
 3.004
*
 2.958 2.663 5.643
**
 
 (1.322) (1.800) (1.986) (2.092) (2.446) 
Observations 6476 3393 3183 2615 2101 
Adjusted R
2
 0.062 0.058 0.051 0.074 0.072 
The regressions also control voor education, wage marital status, number of years contribution to the pension fund 
and subsector. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Table 6 Retired in 2014: results from a linear probability model 
Dependent variable: 
Retired in 2014 
(1) (2) 
   
Treatment dummy -0.245
***
 -0.224
***
 
 (0.029) (0.029) 
Birth date / 1000 -0.553
***
 -0.592
***
 
 (0.062) (0.062) 
Birthdate squared  0.928
***
 
  (0.160) 
Constant 0.623
***
 0.569
***
 
 (0.017) (0.020) 
Observations 4419 4419 
Adjusted R
2
 0.214 0.219 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
 
Table 7 Percentage of people retired by age 
Percentage of people retired at age  Treated Control 
60 2.59 7.24 
61 6.05 12.84 
62 13.84 27.21 
63 26.19 57.30 
64 29.48 69.08 
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Table 8 Heterogeneous effects on the expected retirement age and life course savings in 2007 and actual retirement in 2014 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
ER(2007)-
ER(2002) 
Income, education, partner has pension and health Financial decision making 
Dependent 
variable: Expected 
retirement age in 
2007 
Wage top 
25% 
Wage 
other 
High 
education 
level 
Other 
education 
(low and 
intermediate) 
levels 
Partner has 
own pension 
Partner has 
no own 
pension 
Number of 
sick days top 
25% 
Number of 
sick days 
other 
Risk 
aversion top 
25% 
Risk 
aversion 
other 
Financial 
Risk 
aversion top 
25% 
Financial 
Risk 
aversion 
other 
Capability to 
take difficult 
decisions 
bottom 25% 
Capability to 
take difficult 
decisions 
other 
               
Treatment dummy 0.957*** 0.827*** 0.936*** 0.715*** 0.872*** 0.954*** 1.041*** 0.746*** 1.149*** 0.828*** 1.258*** 0.716*** 0.509 0.848*** 
 (0.183) (0.121) (0.116) (0.198) (0.140) (0.180) (0.239) (0.138) (0.223) (0.131) (0.215) (0.170) (0.316) (0.285) 
Birth date / 1000 -0.006 -0.101 -0.137 0.081 0.100 -0.188 -0.528 0.209 -0.792 -0.069 -0.955* 0.143 1.271* -0.344 
 (0.435) (0.285) (0.275) (0.464) (0.324) (0.430) (0.592) (0.329) (0.530) (0.315) (0.494) (0.403) (0.743) (0.685) 
Birthdate squared 0.127 -1.953*** -0.380 -3.296*** -1.642* -0.694 -0.535 -1.660* -0.138 -1.526* -0.999 -0.981 -4.056** -0.696 
 (1.148) (0.741) (0.720) (1.211) (0.838) (1.145) (1.603) (0.865) (1.423) (0.823) (1.271) (1.053) (1.963) (1.814) 
Constant 0.954*** 1.420*** 1.081*** 1.739*** 1.263*** 1.420*** 1.375*** 1.381*** 1.181*** 1.349*** 1.133*** 1.379*** 1.822*** 1.304*** 
 (0.119) (0.076) (0.074) (0.123) (0.089) (0.115) (0.154) (0.090) (0.149) (0.082) (0.135) (0.105) (0.236) (0.201) 
Observations 1,647 4,958 4,438 2,139 3,279 2,092 1,122 3,148 1,191 3,801 1,418 2,204 669 817 
P-value test 
whether the 
difference in the 
treatment dummy is 
significant 
0.554  0.336  0.665  0.286  0.214  0.048  0.426  
R-squared 0.061 0.037 0.052 0.031 0.053 0.047 0.042 0.046 0.051 0.040 0.054 0.038 0.061 0.030 
Life course 
savings in 2007 
              
               
Treatment dummy 0.088** 0.079*** 0.087*** 0.069*** 0.056** 0.080*** 0.057 0.086*** 0.018 0.105*** 0.032 0.125*** 0.000 0.143*** 
 (0.038) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) (0.025) (0.038) (0.022) (0.035) (0.029) (0.055) (0.044) 
Birth date / 1000 0.140 -0.011 0.048 -0.019 0.117** -0.035 0.027 0.022 0.202** -0.025 0.129 -0.038 0.171 -0.096 
 (0.093) (0.043) (0.052) (0.062) (0.060) (0.057) (0.088) (0.060) (0.094) (0.054) (0.087) (0.071) (0.131) (0.116) 
Birthdate squared 0.394 -0.079 0.106 -0.098 0.100 0.004 0.078 -0.059 0.260 0.014 0.225 0.158 -0.037 0.414 
 (0.252) (0.114) (0.139) (0.160) (0.160) (0.151) (0.244) (0.161) (0.252) (0.146) (0.228) (0.192) (0.341) (0.323) 
Constant 0.090*** 0.059*** 0.077*** 0.045*** 0.088*** 0.042*** 0.060*** 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.076*** 0.045*** 0.097** 0.026 
 (0.022) (0.010) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.014) (0.023) (0.012) (0.020) (0.015) (0.040) (0.025) 
Observations 1,388 3,857 3,615 1,629 2,656 2,055 893 2,575 975 3,084 1,151 1,806 546 681 
P-value test 
whether the 
difference in the 
treatment dummy is 
significant 
0.821  0.606  0.481  0.515  0.047  0.043  0.043  
R-squared 0.040 0.016 0.025 0.014 0.024 0.015 0.013 0.020 0.026 0.022 0.020 0.030 0.012 0.023 
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Table 8 continued               
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Retired in 2014 Income, education, partner has pension and health Financial decision making 
Dependent 
variable: Retired in 
2014 
Wage top 
25% 
Wage 
other 
High 
education 
level 
Other 
education 
(low and 
intermediate) 
levels 
Partner has 
own pension 
Partner has 
no own 
pension 
Number of 
sick days top 
25% 
Number of 
sick days 
other 
Risk 
aversion top 
25% 
Risk 
aversion 
other 
Financial 
Risk 
aversion top 
25% 
Financial 
Risk 
aversion 
other 
Capability to 
take difficult 
decisions 
bottom 25% 
Capability to 
take difficult 
decisions 
other 
               
Treatment dummy -0.180*** -0.298*** -0.222*** -0.365*** -0.252*** -0.320*** -0.345*** -0.223*** -0.275*** -0.246*** -0.284*** -0.269*** 0.015 0.077 
 (0.046) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.032) (0.039) (0.052) (0.032) (0.050) (0.030) (0.048) (0.039) (0.078) (0.062) 
Birth date / 1000 -0.709*** -0.513*** -0.620*** -0.434*** -0.603*** -0.468*** -0.393*** -0.685*** -0.602*** -0.606*** -0.499*** -0.573*** -0.805*** -0.940*** 
 (0.101) (0.056) (0.061) (0.084) (0.069) (0.088) (0.118) (0.070) (0.110) (0.066) (0.106) (0.084) (0.182) (0.151) 
Birthdate squared 0.616** 0.509*** 0.441*** 0.719*** 0.747*** 0.290 0.503 0.569*** 0.794*** 0.438*** 0.961*** 0.210 1.759*** 2.168*** 
 (0.260) (0.143) (0.156) (0.216) (0.176) (0.231) (0.308) (0.180) (0.276) (0.168) (0.271) (0.215) (0.468) (0.408) 
Constant 0.568*** 0.665*** 0.634*** 0.654*** 0.634*** 0.667*** 0.721*** 0.601*** 0.659*** 0.633*** 0.652*** 0.662*** 0.228*** 0.188*** 
 (0.031) (0.016) (0.018) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.034) (0.021) (0.032) (0.019) (0.030) (0.025) (0.060) (0.047) 
Observations 1,713 5,136 4,589 2,204 3,377 2,158 1,147 3,269 1,241 3,914 1,465 2,268 694 842 
P-value test 
whether the 
difference in the 
treatment dummy is 
significant 
0.024  0.002  0.180  0.046  0.582  0.808  0.364  
R-squared 0.221 0.252 0.225 0.285 0.247 0.253 0.247 0.245 0.265 0.238 0.248 0.252 0.118 0.134 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Figure 1 Expected retirement benefit in 2007 
  
The figure presents the expected retirement benefit (for two successive birth months). The vertical line marks the 
threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
 
Figure 2 Expected retirement age before the reform 
 
 
The figure presents the expected retirement age in 2002 (retrospectively measured in 2007). The vertical line marks 
the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
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Figure 3 Expected retirement age one year after the reform (2007) 
 
 
The figure presents the expected retirement age in 2007 (for two successive birth months). The vertical line marks 
the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
 
Figure 4 Additional pension wealth (2007) 
 
 
The figures present information on participation in the life course savings program and whether workers invested in 
additional pension insurance in the previous year (for two successive birth months). The vertical line marks the 
threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
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Figure 5 Months earlier retirement due to Life course savings (2009) 
 
The figure presents the number of months that workers expect to save in the life course savings program (for two 
successive birth months). The vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
 
Figure 6 Developments in expected age of retirement 
 
The figures present the expected retirement age for the period 2007-2011 (for two successive birth months). The 
vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
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Figure 7 Retirement realizations in 2014 
 
The figure presents the retirement rates in 2014(for two successive birth months). The vertical line marks the 
threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
 
  
49 
 
Appendix A 
Figure A1 Expected pension benefits in the longer run  
The figures present the expected retirement benefits for the period 2007-2011 (for two successive birth months). The 
vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. 
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Table A1 Retirement expectations in 2002 
Expected retirement age in 
2002 
(1) (2) 
Treatment dummy -0.054 -0.074 
 (0.109) (0.106) 
Birth date /100 -0.105 -0.196 
 (0.258) (0.251) 
Birth date^2 1.530
**
 1.337
**
 
 (0.688) (0.669) 
Married  -0.216
**
 
  (0.106) 
Low educated 
(intermediate education is 
ref) 
 -0.203
*
 
  (0.107) 
High educated  0.280
***
 
  (0.094) 
Wage (ln)  0.520
***
 
  (0.137) 
Number of contribution 
years to the pension fund 
 -0.082
***
 
  (0.006) 
Constant 61.398
***
 58.313
***
 
 (0.071) (1.466) 
Number of observations 6696 6564 
Adjusted R-squared 0.001 0.078 
Standard errors in parentheses. Other control variables included: sector dummies. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Table A2 Longer run effects on the expected retirement age in 2007 before and after the 
reform: OLS results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Expected 
retirement age 
in 2007 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Treatment 
dummy 
0.814
***
 0.530
***
 0.436
***
 0.682
***
 0.726
***
 
 (0.081) (0.100) (0.096) (0.092) (0.101) 
Birth date / 1000 -0.274 -0.117 0.058 -0.094 -0.353 
 (0.192) (0.239) (0.231) (0.228) (0.247) 
Birthdate 
squared 
-0.242 0.101 0.231 0.459 0.815 
 (0.505) (0.629) (0.615) (0.617) (0.667) 
Married 0.057 -0.032 -0.081 -0.002 -0.145 
 (0.079) (0.109) (0.099) (0.118) (0.112) 
Low educated -0.229
***
 -0.201
**
 -0.143 0.068 0.093 
 (0.077) (0.093) (0.095) (0.095) (0.126) 
High educated 0.063 -0.060 -0.098 -0.027 -0.054 
 (0.068) (0.081) (0.083) (0.078) (0.078) 
Wage (ln) 0.124 0.104 0.270
**
 0.226
*
 0.441
***
 
 (0.103) (0.128) (0.131) (0.130) (0.135) 
Number of 
contribution 
years to the 
pension fund 
-0.052
***
 -0.060
***
 -0.046
***
 -0.047
***
 -0.050
***
 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Constant 62.993
***
 63.787
***
 61.875
***
 62.412
***
 60.716
***
 
 (1.099) (1.382) (1.414) (1.414) (1.494) 
Observations 6569 3446 3879 3259 2632 
Adjusted R
2
 0.093 0.092 0.072 0.109 0.131 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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Appendix B Sample attrition  
Table B1 Number of individuals after selections 
  
Number of individuals Percentage of population 
  
Affected by the 
reform 
Not affected by the 
reform 
Affected by the 
reform 
Not affected by the 
reform 
Population 
    2007 
 
14,251 13,468 
  2008 
 
14,247 13,467 
  2009 
 
14,247 13,465 
  2010  14,199 13,415   
2011  14,199 13,412   
Sample before selections 
   2007 
 
4,341 4,175 30 31 
2008 
 
3,079 2,990 22 22 
2009 
 
3,952 3,758 28 28 
2010  3,730 3,607 26 27 
2011  2,841 2,730 20 20 
Sample after selection employed 
  2007 
 
3,950 3,780 28 28 
2008 
 
3,041 2,906 21 22 
2009 
 
3,856 3,629 27 27 
2010  3,599 3,324 25 25 
2011  2,603 2,345 18 17 
Sample after selection employed and individuals without FLO arrangements 
2007 
 
3,686 3,326 26 25 
2008 
 
2,862 2,589 20 19 
2009 
 
3,529 3,083 25 23 
2010  3,352 2,916 24 22 
2011  2,505 2,143 18 16 
Sample after selection employed and individuals without FLO arrangements and without career breaks 
2007 
 
3,559 3,309 25 25 
2008 
 
2,770 2,577 19 19 
2009 
 
3,424 3,053 24 23 
2010  3,256 2,882 23 21 
2011  2,437 2,116 17 16 
Sample after selection employed and individuals without FLO arrangements and without career breaks and expected 
retirement age is not missing 
2007 
 
3,468 3,234 24 24 
2008 
 
2,072 2,070 15 15 
2009 
 
3,196 2,888 22 21 
2010  2,969 2,631 21 20 
2011  2,173 1,847 15 14 
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Sample after selection employed and individuals without FLO arrangements and without career breaks and expected 
retirement age is not missing and conditional on presence in 2007 
2007  3,468 3,234 24 24 
2008  1,864 1,863 13 14 
2009  2,054 1,864 14 14 
2010  1,946 1,719 14 13 
2011  1,453 1,232 10 9 
 
 
 
Table B2 OLS results: selection into the survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Participation in the 
survey 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
      
Treated (affected by 
the policy) 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.310*** 0.222*** 0.279*** 0.269*** 0.204*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Observations 27719 27714 27712 27614 27611 
R-squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Participation in the 
survey (conditional 
on response in 2007) 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
      
Treated (affected by 
the policy) 
-0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Constant 0.310*** 0.200*** 0.181*** 0.177*** 0.135*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 27719 27714 27712 27614 27611 
R-squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
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Table B3 Sample averages in 2007: People who stay in the survey in later years vs non-
respondents 
 
Affected by the 
reform 
Not affected 
by the reform 
P-
value 
Affected by 
the reform 
Not affected 
by the reform 
P-
value 
 Participated in later waves Non-respondents in later waves 
Personal characteristics 
   
   
Low education level 
 
0.121 0.104 0.289 0.143 0.136 0.680 
High education level 
 
0.706 0.702 0.459 0.624 0.678 0.446 
Married 
  
0.912 0.927 0.845 0.901 0.911 0.950 
         
Job characteristics         
Number of years contributed to the pension 
fund 30.925 31.631 0.722 30.928 32.113 0.900 
Log of early wage income  10.815 10.822 0.298 10.770 10.784 0.344 
Number of contractual work hours 0.996 0.997 0.750 0.996 0.995 0.994 
         
Sectors         
Government   0.477 0.441 0.625 0.483 0.457 0.537 
Education   0.454 0.492 0.423 0.438 0.479 0.622 
Privatized   0.069 0.066 0.534 0.078 0.064 0.344 
 
   
     
Alternative income and 
savings 
     
   
Life course savings 0.160 0.068 0.000 0.157 0.058 0.016 
Extra pension savings in previous year 0.251 0.212 0.339 0.271 0.219 0.079  
Partner with own income 0.744 0.727 0.219 0.745 0.736 0.427 
Pension with own pension 0.577 0.571 0.309 0.567 0.581 0.281 
Positive net housing wealth 0.709 0.686 0.069 0.672 0.691 0.600 
Number of alternative wealth sources 2.407 2.380 0.925 2.252 2.425 0.310 
       
Retirement expectations       
Expected retirement benefit 66.631 71.656 0.000 67.674 72.765 0.000 
Expected retirement age  63.507 62.981 0.000 63.316 62.498 0.000  
Expected retirement age before the reform 61.387 61.685 0.617 61.197 61.241 0.081 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
Table B4 Expected age of retirement in 2007 interacted with dummy for attrition in later 
years: OLS results 
 Expected Retirement Age 2007  
 (1) (2) 
Treatment dummy 0.724*** 0.729*** 
 (0.098) (0.097) 
Attrition -0.424*** -1.848 
 (0.101) (2.225) 
Attrition * Treatment  0.171 0.168 
 (0.167) (0.166) 
Birth date / 1000 -0.298 -0.370 
 (0.243) (0.237) 
Birthdate squared 0.561 0.329 
 (0.656) (0.642) 
Married  -0.004 
  (0.107) 
Low educated  -0.243** 
  (0.100) 
High educated  -0.001 
  (0.083) 
Wage (ln)  0.041 
  (0.136) 
Number of contribution years to the 
pension fund 
 -0.051*** 
  (0.006) 
Constant 62.900*** 64.134*** 
 (0.061) (1.451) 
Observations 6,702 6,569 
Adjusted R
2
 0.061 0.113 
Standard errors in parentheses. Other control variables included: sector dummies.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
